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CASE COMMENTS
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: JUDICIAL
LIMITATIONS ON THEIR POWER
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952)
Defendants were indicted for contempt of Congress for refusing to
answer questions posed by the Senate Crime Committee., Their refusal was not based upon the privilege against self-incrimination 2 but
on the general ground that their "constitutional rights" were being
violated by the use of television, newsreel cameras, and other apparatus. HELD, the defendants were not guilty of contempt; their refusal to answer was justified, since the truth as a necessary objective
of the hearings could not be elicited in such surroundings. In so
holding, the court stated that no constitutional question was involved.
It is well settled that Congress has the power of investigation as
a necessary adjunct of its general legislative powers. 3 The boundaries
of this investigative power have not been explicitly defined but it
includes (1) the fact finding function necessary for informed legislation,-' (2) supervision of the adequacy and administration of legislation,0 and (3) possibly the power to inform the public.6 Some critics of extensive Congressional inquisitorial powers have suggested
that Congress has, in an indirect and circuitous manner, usurped
prosecutorial powers in its attempts to aid in the prosecution or pun7
ishment of criminals, when it clearly has no such power.
'Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce,
SEN. REs. 202, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
2U.S. CONsr. Amend. V.
3Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204

(U.S. 1821).
4See note 3 supra.

5United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
OU.S, CONsr. Art. I, §5, cl. 3; see Electric Bond and Share Co. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 437 (1938); Railroad Labor Board v. Robertson,
3 F.2d 488, 494 (N.D. Ill. 1925).
7
See Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
954 (1951) (employee's action against employer for dismissal resulting from alleged
degradation of employer by refusal of employee to testify before the Un-American
Activities Committee); Gelhorn, Report on a Report of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 1193 (1947); Stamps, The Power of
Congress to Inquire and Punish for Contempt, 4 BAYLOR L. Rav. 29 (1951).
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The power of Congress to investigate is implemented by its contempt powers, when acting as the forum itself" or through the judic
iary by statute9 or both.10 Congressional contempt powers against
obstructions, even past ones, 1 ' are limited to imprisonment of the
12
offender for the term of the session, and it can levy no fines. Most
of the recent contempt cases have been prosecuted through the judiciary to obviate the necessity of action by the entire chamber and
to be able, indirectly, to subject the defendant to fines and determinate
sentences. Both courses of action have led to much litigation because
of the necessarily delicate balancing of private against public interests.
3
The constitutional safeguards against infringment of free speech,'
4
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,' and the right
to refuse to bear witness against oneself15 are the only constitutional
rights which have heretofore been invoked by witnesses while testifying before Congressional committees. Of these, only the right against
self-incrimination has been particularly successful. 16 Vague limits of
pertinency have been imposed on unreasonable searches and seizures,17
and the protection of free speech can only be invoked when there is
no "potential" danger of a threat to national welfare. 8 Safeguards
SMcGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
Rxv. SrAT. §102 (1875), as amended, 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. §192 (1946).
See SEN. REs. 119, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), which cited defendants in the instant
case to the judiciary for prosecution.
lojurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
"Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
'2Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1880), the Court said that Congress is not exerting a judicial power when
committing persons for contempt. If it had not so held, the commitment would
not have been subject to collateral attack and therefore not subject to judicial
review.
'3U.S. CONsT. Amend. I.
'4U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
'5U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
16United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1952); Marcello v. United
States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1951); United
States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (D. Hawaii 1950).
"7Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
lsLawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 994
(1950); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948); for a review of recent developments in the law of free speech see
Kittleson and Smith, Free Speech (1949-1952): Slogans v. States' Rights, 5 U.
oF FLA. L. REv. 227 (1952).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1953], Art. 4
CASE COMMENTS

against undue Congressional inquisitorial powers which have been
invoked under "procedural due process"'19 have been strictly limited
by recent decisions.
Procedural safeguards which have been invoked are: (1) the empowering resolution is invalid if too broad in scope; (2) the questions
asked must be pertinent to the inquiry; (3) "wilfulness" in the contempt-of-Congress statute contemplates a criminal intent; and (4) an
investigating committee is not legally constituted unless a quorum is
present.
The empowering resolution must have a definite legislative purpose,20 though it need not be expressly stated. 2' Since Congress has
the power to determine (1) its authority to legislate in a given area,
(2) the existence of a need for legislation, and (3) the desirable action,
if any,2 2 there can be little help in a plea that the empowering resolution is unconstitutional because too broad in scope. 23 The questions
asked of the witnesses must be pertinent to the subject under inquiry.24 The pertinency of the question is a matter of law, and a
mistake of law is not available to the accused as a defense.25 The empowering resolution defines the limits of the investigation and hence
the relevancy of the interrogation. "Wilfulness" in the contempt-ofCongress statute has been defined as any voluntary action not the
result of an accident or a mistake of fact 26 but not necessarily done
with a criminal intent.2 7 A quorum was at one time a requirement
to make an investigating committee a competent tribunal for prose'DU.S. CONST. Amend. V.
2OKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
21McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Barsky v. United States, supra
note 18; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 838 (1948). But cf. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
cert. granted, 73 Sup. Ct. 16 (1952).
22Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling. 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Barry v.
United States, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
23Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
934 (1950).
24McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Marshall v. United States, 176
F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
25Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Townsend v. United States, 95
F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
2Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947). But cf. United States v.
Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1952).
27Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948).
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cution for perjury; 28 but the Senate, under its powers to prescribe its
own rules of procedure, 29 has resolved that one member constitutes
a quorum under specified conditions.3 0 Thus it can be seen that procedural safeguards are practically unavailable. 31
The court in the instant case has deliberately side-stepped any
constitutional questions. The opinion reasons that the objective ot
any investigation is to ascertain the true facts and that the atmosphere
of the forum did not lend itself to this purpose; s" the witnesses were
therefore justified in refusing to testify. Perhaps the court desired to
stay out of any controversy as to the power of the judiciary to limit
the power of the legislature; yet this case may create a new and desirable limitation on what is regarded by many as the excessive zeal
of the Congress.
The problem is one of balancing the rights of the individual, when
such rights become clothed with the public interest, against the powers
of the Government under the surveillance of the perhaps ethereal
power 33 of the courts to control Congress in its legislative investi2sChristoffell v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
29U.S. CONST., Art. I, §5, d. 2.
3OSEN. RFs. 180, 96 Cong. Rec. 1284 (1950); see also United States v. Bryan, 72
F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947), aff'd. sub nom. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 141
(D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
"1See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Three of the six concurring opinions indicated that injury to one's reputation or
business by unreasonable and arbitrary executive defamation would be a deprivation
of property without due process of law.
32Here the court could have analogized the instant case to a criminal trial and
said that it is a duty of the court (Senate Crime Committee) to see that the trial
results in the finding and pronouncement of the truth, Pfaff v. United States, 85
F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1936). Technically, no analogy exists and, if the court had so
attempted to analogize, innumerable constitutional and policy questions would have
arisen. Compare United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1952) where, in
speaking of a televised Congressional hearing, the court said, ".

.

. nor was the

hearing so lacking in decorum . . . that it can not be regarded as a 'competent
tribunal,"' with Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce (Senate Crime Committee), Sen. Rep. 725, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess., 99-100 (1951), stating that television is not well suited to eliciting the
truth.
"3In United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court held that Congress'
methods of procedure should bear a reasonable relation to the result which is
sought. That this rule has not been expanded as a means of control over Congress
is perhaps indicative of the Court's desire not to clash headlong with an equal
but separate branch of the Government. See United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp.
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